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Recent Trends in Chinese Labour
Issues—Signs of Change
Anita Chan
Migrant workers withdrawing their labour
1 Newspaper reports about Chinese cities and towns experiencing a shortage of labour
began appearing in 20032,  and again in March 2004 following Chinese New Year3.  By
mid-2004  a  spate  of  reports  surfaced in  the  press  indicating  that  the  problem had
reached  crisis  level  in  the  coastal  industrial  regions,  particularly  in  Guangdong
province—and Dongguan city, where Taiwanese factories are concentrated, reportedly
the  most  affected.  The  shortage  was  first  noticed  when  fewer  migrants  from  the
countryside arrived to look for jobs after Chinese New Year in February. But it made
headline news when the busy production season set  in around June,  when massive
amounts of overtime work normally begin. Chinese newspaper photos showed factories
setting up roadside stalls trying to recruit workers. Teeming crowds of migrants no
longer  jostled  before  factory  gates  for  a  job.  In  December  2004  a  garment  factory
manager in Dongguan claimed to me that 80% to 90% of the factories could not hire
enough labour and so had to scale down production capacity. He wanted, he said, to
hire at least another hundred workers. He was about to approach the factory owner to
ask that funds be allocated to improve conditions so that he could attract more workers
after the 2005 Chinese New Year.
2 Media reports on the labour shortages have offered a variety of explanations, all of
which are valid:  poor working conditions,  low wages,  decreases  in wages,  wages in
arrears, various forms of abuses, improving economic conditions in the rural sector due
to recent higher prices for agricultural produce and lower agricultural taxes, etc. Above
all, the press recognises that pay and work conditions have deteriorated so much that
migrants are no longer interested in working away from their villages, particularly in
Guangdong. Weighing the value of their labour against the pay offered, the investment
involved in making the journey to look for work and the risk of not being paid or being
injured in an industrial accident, they prefer to stay at home. In this sense, the free
labour market in China is indeed functioning freely. But which of these contributing
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factors finally broke the camel’s back? My own belief is that against declining wage
levels and mounting problem of unpaid wages, people feel that migrating to look for a
factory job does not pay4. 
3 In real terms migrant workforce incomes have been progressively falling5. The Ministry
of Labour and Social  Security recently recognised this in an official  release stating,
“Studies show the salary of a migrant worker in the Pearl River Delta area has grown by
a  mere  68  yuan  (US$8.2)  over  the  last  12  years,  far  behind  the  increase  in  living
expenses, and in real terms, wages are declining”6, one can add, by a large margin. The
wages  have  also  become irregular.  Labour  flexibility  has  become so  prevalent  that
when there is no work, workers sometimes have no income; and during busy periods, a
vast amount of overtime is often imposed in violation of national laws—at its worst, up
to one hundred hours or more a week, especially at some of the private factories that
produce for export.
4 Just  as  bad,  the amount  of  unpaid  wages  has  been  increasing  annually.  I  started
collecting Chinese newspaper clippings on this problem in the mid-1990s. At that time,
reports on migrant workers not getting paid were regarded as isolated incidents7. but
as the years went by the problem became endemic. Even local governments began to
see a need to intervene. Every year just before Chinese New Year, local governments
would launch “chasing after wage-arrears campaigns” (zhuihui qianxin yundong) and
then  would  proudly  announce  xxx  million  yuan  had  been  “chased  back”  for  the
workers.  The amounts soared year after year8.  In Guangdong province the amounts
“chased back” in 1995, 1997 and 1998 were 21 million yuan, 1.5 billion yuan and 5.6
billion yuan respectively. 
5 But these amounts could only be the tip of the iceberg of the total amount of unpaid
wages, since many cases were not reported. Even when reported and dealt with by the
authorities,  factories  sometimes  have  simply  refused  to  comply.  According  to  one
survey, 72.5% of migrants have suffered from varying degrees of wage defaults. There is
little legal protection against unpaid wages9. The formal procedures taken by Labour
Inspection Departments when demanding that a factory pay unpaid wages are so lax
that management can easily default by closing down the factory and opening another10.
The situation has become so serious that one Chinese newspaper report has declared
“Wage arrears have become a ‘custom’”11; and another opined that it needs “a strong
dose of medicine”12 to cure it. 
6 The national figures on the construction industry can serve as a guide to the enormity
of  the problem. The estimates on unpaid wages in the state-regulated construction
sector in the past few years have been 278 billion yuan in 2001, 336.5 billion yuan for
200213, and 367 billion yuan for 2004 up to August14. Yet these are figures for only one
part of one industrial sector comprising 38 million migrant workers15. What about the
manufacturing sector, in particular the export-oriented sector, which employs a larger
labour force? The reports about migrant workers in the export-oriented factories being
owed  wages  indicates  the  problem  is  possibly  even  more  serious  there,  and  the
cumulative amount of unpaid wages higher.
7 In past years, the authorities did not find a solution to the problem of declining wages
and unpaid wages. The best they could do was to help a minority of lucky workers to
“chase back” wages before Chinese New Year. Today, it looks like the migrant workers
have found their own solution—by withdrawing their labour and staying at home in the
villages, causing a crisis of a “shortage of migrant workers” (mingong huang). Unable
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to  collectively  bargain  at  the  workplace,  the  rural  population  of  China,  without
organising themselves,  are engaging in a form of spontaneous collective action and
initiating changes in China’s macro-labour market. In this sense, from the poor work
conditions something positive is being generated.
The settlement of workers’ grievances through legal channels
8 A second type of change on the labour front relates to workers’ growing awareness and
use of the legal arena. The three main labour-related laws—the Enterprise Law passed
in 1988, the Trade Union Law of 1992 and the Labour Law of 1994—have provided a
legal  framework for  the  development  of  industrial  relations  at  a  time of  economic
restructuring and the transition of many state enterprises to private ownership. They
all  contain  clauses  that  potentially  could  empower  workers  through  a  number  of
important  labour  protection  articles,  though  without  the  freedom  to  organise
independent trade unions. Under the Trade Union Law, work stoppages and slowdowns
are deemed to be legal, and one of the core international labour rights, the right of
collective bargaining, is guaranteed by the Labour Law16. The new laws have stipulated
a maximum number of work hours and a minimum age to enter the work force. They
have established industrial labour dispute procedures, and include clauses on the right
to  a  democratically  elected  workplace  union—statutes  on  a  par  with  international
standards. In fact, at least one provision in Chinese law surpasses international labour
standards:  a  stipulation  that  state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises  are  to
contain a Staff and Workers Representative Congress, which has been given the legal
power (on paper, at least) to supervise management and to co-determine or to veto
certain management decisions17. 
9 Notwithstanding this flurry of commendable legislative activity on behalf of employees’
rights, it is clear that there has been a relative lack of enforcement of the labour laws
and  that  there  are  major  violations  of  workers’  rights,  even  in  some  state-owned
factories. Workers in both the state and non-state sectors are laid off with impunity, for
instance, without regard to the legal procedures for doing so. “Unfair dismissal” does
not even enter the Chinese labour lexicon. But workers have begun to protest.
Reactive legal protest activities 
10 As economic restructuring steamed ahead at a rapid pace in the 1990s, and as labour
violations became more serious and widespread, worker protests had by the mid-1990s
increased in scale and frequency. Much of this has been documented in the Chinese
press and by the international media and Western scholars. The new labour laws also
had their effect.  The number of  labour disputes that went to arbitration under the
provisions of the labour laws leaped, from 19,000 in 1994 to 184,000 in 200218. The pro-
labour clauses that had been inserted into the laws helped to channel some grievances
into legal procedural action. The laws not only have provided a platform for this, but
workers’ awareness of their legal rights also has been on the rise.
11 The majority of these cases involve serious labour abuses, such as owing workers wages
in  arrears  (both  in  state  and  non-state  enterprises),  state  workers  being  laid  off,
irregularity in pension payments, excessively long work hours, a lack of compensation
for  industrial  injuries,  and  contraction  of  work-related  diseases.  According  to  one
study, the less educated workers tend to take their grievances to the Visits and Letters
Offices that are run by the cities’ Labour Bureaus, People’s Congresses or Party organs,
while the more educated and skilled employees more often take their cases to legal
arbitration19. Either way, these are reactive claims, employing spaces provided by the
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legal  system to  redress  injustices.  They are  not  proactive  claims to  rights  that  are
collective in nature, such as laying legal claims against management for refusing to
collectively bargain, or against trade union officials for not protecting their rights20. In
fact, the legal channels may even serve to avert a crisis situation where workers might
actively seek to set up alternative trade unions or engage in mass protest, the reason in
fact  behind  the  government’s  policy  to  regulate  industrial  relations  through  legal
channels.
12 The  passage  of  the  new laws  has  also  led  to  a  substantial  number  of  lawyers  and
paralegals offering services to workers who seek compensation through law suits for
industrial injuries and occupational diseases. Some of the lawyers operate from within
the legal aid centres of university law schools or the trade unions,21 while others have
started  their  own  private  practices.  The  suits seeking  compensation  are  becoming
increasingly aggressive, despite their reactive nature, and the government is willing to
grant more space to such court actions. Nonetheless, the litigation is a long drawn-out
process,  and most ordinary workers and migrant workers can ill  afford the time or
money to pursue this channel.
13 When  the  legal  channels  fail  to  resolve  problems,  protest  activities  escalate  into
collective street action. In the state sector, workers continue to hark back to “collective
memories of state socialism”22, and are often motivated by a subsistence crisis caused
by managerial corruption23. These tend to be workers who have been laid off or are in
the midst of being laid off or forced into early retirement. Workers still in employment
do not normally join in24. 
Participatory rights at enterprise level
14 Another  type  of  phenomenon  that  warrants  attention  are  the  Staff  and  Workers
Representative Congresses (SWRCs, zhigong daibiao dahui). These first appeared in the
1950s, were revived a few years before the industrial reforms began in the mid-1980s,
and  were  used  during  the  following  years  by  at  least  some  workplace  unions  to
counteract  the  rising  power  of  factory  managers25.  Although  workers  in  state  and
collective  enterprises  are  supposedly  empowered  to  participate  in  this  so-called
“democratic  management”,  the  attempt  has  not  met  with  much success26.  In  many
enterprises they are never convened, and in some others they are controlled entirely
by management.  Yet the Congresses have not been entirely useless.  SWRCs,  though
weak, sometimes serve to check total management domination. In some cases, a state
enterprise’s directors may even prefer to enlist the enterprise Congress’s involvement
when matters arise that of  considerable concern to the workforce27.  In the Chinese
press, particularly in newspapers published by the Chinese trade union structure, there
have  also  been  reports  of  cases  where  workers  faced  with  unemployment  and
disentitlement of benefits or efforts to privatise the firm by corrupt managers and local
officials have, against the odds, taken matters into their own hands and convened their
enterprise  Staff  and  Workers  Congress  to  fight  off  the  attempts,  in  some  cases
successfully sacking the managers28.
The union federation subjected to new pressures 
15 Although  Chinese  labour  laws  do  not  allow  truly  independent  trade  unions,  they
contain provisions for internal democracy in the official enterprise-level trade union
branches. In a one-party state that controls the appointment of union officials, to speak
of exercising internal democracy may seem an oxymoron. But after a decade and a half
of competitive elections for village leaders, there is a widespread awareness in China
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regarding elections. Nonetheless, despite the provisions in the labour laws, as yet there
has been no surge of suggestions from Chinese academics or by the more adventurous
wings of the Chinese press that, like farmers, workers should be allowed to elect their
own  representatives.  Over  the  past  three  years  the  biggest  push  for  management-
labour dialogue and even elections at the workplace have come from outside China. 
The Corporate Social Responsibility debate 
16 The  concept  of  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  was  introduced  into  China  in  the
mid-1990s. It originated with the anti-sweatshop movement in the developed countries,
which accused brand-name Western corporations of turning a blind eye to dangerous,
inhumane conditions in the factories  around the world that  make merchandise  for
them under contract. To ward off the criticism, many Western companies have adopted
“corporate codes of conduct”, demanding compliance with a minimum set of standards
by their sub-contractors29. Many have hired corps of monitors and auditors to police
the subcontractors’ factories, threatening monetary penalties or cancelling orders if
factory managements violate their codes30. 
17 The movement’s impact on China became visible by the end of the 1990s. In the mid-
nineties,  when  I  visited  Taiwanese  and  Hong  Kong-owned  supplier  factories  in
Guangdong  and  Fujian  provinces,  owners  and  managers  mentioned  nothing  of
pressures  from  the  Western  corporations.  But  beginning  around  2000,  some
complained  bitterly  about  such  pressures  mounting.  As  a  consequence,  working
conditions have improved at some of the larger factories, though excessive overtime
continues to remain a serious problem at practically all of these factories.
18 Most  of  the  subcontractors,  though,  quietly  sought  to  circumvent  the  Western
corporations’ codes of conduct. They gradually learned to bribe or trick the monitors,
developing elaborate double book-keeping, and coaching workers on what to say to
monitors. In turn, many of the Western corporations have moved on to a new stage:
paying trainers to go into the subcontractors’  factories to educate workers in their
labour  rights.  There  are  no  official  statistics,  but  based  on  the  large  number  of
organisations, including the official All-China Women’s Federation in Guangdong, that
have been hired to provide “worker training”, it appears that a fair portion of the more
than 10 million migrant factory workers in South China have had at least a couple of
hours of this awareness-raising exercise. 
19 The  Guangdong  government  and  provincial  trade  union  ignored  the  monitoring
activities for some years, but more recently have felt a need to learn more about the
impact  of  problematic  labour  standards  and industrial  relations  on  the  investment
climate.  They  have  invited  experts  to  hold  workshops  on  the  anti-sweatshop
movement, corporate social responsibility, and the efforts to monitor supplier firms31.
Aware that Asian countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand32 are willing to
accept  the  corporate  social  responsibility  movement  in  the  hope  of  attracting
additional  foreign investment,  the  Guangdong government began to  feel  obliged to
come up with a positive position on this.
20 Within the past year, the national media was also onto the issue. 2004, for instance, saw
a flood of reports and discussions about the New York-based multi-stakeholder NGO
Social  Accountability  International  (SAI),  which  issues  SA8000  licences  to
manufacturing facilities that comply with the labour standards set by the organisation.
A heated debate in the Chinese news media over whether SA8000 is an instrument to
protect  the  rights  of  Chinese  workers33 or  a  stick  wielded  on  behalf  of  Western
Recent Trends in Chinese Labour Issues—Signs of Change
China Perspectives, 57 | january - february 2005
5
“protectionism” suddenly brought the issue of corporate social responsibility into the
open.  Those  in China  who  want  to  see  the  labour  conditions  of  migrant  workers
improve welcome SAI’s efforts to oversee the SA8000 standard, while those who do not,
for fear of the loss of China’s “competitive edge”, see SA8000 as an unwanted Western
intervention34.  Some Chinese reporters,  confused about  the issue,  wrongly reported
that SA8000 is a US government ploy. 
21 The government in Peking has been of mixed minds on this issue of corporate social
responsibility  and  internationally  supervised  labour  standards.  The  Chinese  State
Council’s Development Research Centre agreed to co-sponsor, with the Organisation of
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD),  an  international  conference  on
"Socially Responsible Investment in China and North-East Asia—The Role of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”35. The conference was scheduled to convene
in Peking in mid-December 2004 and was to be attended by government, corporate and
trade union delegates from around the world. But there was strong opposition to the
conference within the Chinese government, and just ten days before it was to open the
government abruptly called it off.
22 John Sweeney,  president  of  the  American trade union federation,  the  AFL-CIO,  was
scheduled to head a high-powered delegation from the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), containing the heads of several other Western trade union
federations, to the Peking conference. The ICFTU, mired in a cold-war mentality, has
refused to let the Chinese trade union federation, the ACFTU, into the international
trade-union club. But this time there were signs of a rapprochement; the delegation
had  agreed  to  engage  in  high-level  meetings  with  the  ACFTU  following  the  OECD
conference.  The  ACFTU  has  been  eager  to  be  welcomed  into  the  fold  of  the
“brotherhood” of the international trade union movement, and the meeting in Peking
would  be  a  breakthrough.  Such  hopes  were  dashed  by  the  Chinese  government’s
sudden announcement. On top of cancelling the OECD conference, it also cancelled all
of the delegates’ visas to China, making it impossible for the ICFTU delegates to visit
China even as private individuals, let alone meet with their Chinese counterparts. The
decisions to cancel the OECD conference and the visas were taken at a level far higher
than the ACFTU, and appears to have taken its leadership by surprise.
23 A  second  incident  in  early  December  2004  helps  to  put  the  Chinese  government’s
sudden decision into context. The British Consulate in Guangzhou held a conference in
a  hotel  in  Shenzhen—hub  of  southern  China’s  export  drive—on  “The  UK  and  the
Greater Pearl River Delta: Developing Corporate Social Responsibility Together”. At the
conference Chen Ying, the Deputy Director General of China’s Enterprise Confederation
(CEC,  Zhongguo qiye lianhe),  dropped a  bombshell.  CEC is  China’s  major  employers
association and represents China’s employers in the ILO. Though the organisation was
only  set  up  in  the  1980s,  and  is  still  very  much  under  the  wing  of  the  Chinese
government,  the  confidence  of  its  mission  is  embodied  in  Ms  Chen.  She  told  the
audience in no uncertain terms that foreign corporations should abide by the Chinese
labour  laws,  but  because  the  laws  are  not  yet  perfected  the  CEC,  with  twenty
government departments, was now developing its own standards for corporate social
responsibility.  The  message:  we  Chinese  are  saying  “no”  to  your  foreign-imposed
workplace standards. The OECD’s guidelines are obviously among the unwanted foreign
standards.
The new push to unionise foreign-run enterprises
Recent Trends in Chinese Labour Issues—Signs of Change
China Perspectives, 57 | january - february 2005
6
24 Under China’s  labour laws,  all  enterprises,  including the private and foreign-owned
ones, are supposed to contain an enterprise-level union branch, and the employer is
supposed to pay an amount equal to 2% of the factory payroll every month to the union
to cover its expenses. Generally, the enterprise unions have been tame and normally
under  management’s  control.  But  even so,  owners  have  preferred  not  to  have  any
union, and the ACFTU generally has neglected to press the point. 
25 Only within the past two years has the ACFTU openly criticised a foreign firm in the
mass media for refusing to set up an ACFTU trade-union branch. Wal-Mart, the world’s
largest retailer,  is  the target of  these attacks,  for its  insistence on rejecting official
union  representation  at  its  Wal-Mart  retail  outlets  in  China.  Subsequently,  other
multinationals such as Motorola, Kodak, Samsung, etc., were also named, but Wal-Mart
remained the main focus for the ACFTU, which declared that legal action would be
taken if Wal-Mart did not comply with the Chinese trade-union law36. Since the ACFTU
made this public statement, a flood of reports has appeared in the Chinese press, some
lambasting Wal-Mart for exploiting China’s workers37. The Chinese media also carried a
report by an American NGO, the National Labour Committee, on labour exploitation at
a Hong Kong-owned factory that supplies toys to Wal-Mart38. Notably, these articles for
the first time placed the exploitation of Chinese workers in the context of the global
chain of production. Prior to this, Chinese media reports always described abuses of
workers in China’s export industries as if they were isolated phenomena.
26 In November 2004, Wal-Mart surrendered to the ACFTU’s pressure and agreed to allow
the establishment of workplace unions at all of its stores in China39. This is the first
time anywhere in the world that Wal-Mart has made concessions to a trade union (in
this case because the ACFTU has the support behind it of the Chinese government).
Wal-Mart’s total concession has set a powerful precedent. Other foreign enterprises are
on notice that they will need to accept, and pay for, an ACFTU branch within their
premises. 
Enterprise-level trade union elections
27 One of the anti-sweatshop movement’s demands has been that workers in the supplier
factories should have freedom of association, not an easy aim to achieve in China. Some
of the Western corporations that are the most serious in addressing this have initiated
occupational health and safety committees or other forms of workers’ representative
committees.  Reebok  has  gone  further,  and  has  successfully  pressured  three  of  its
supplier factories, owned by Taiwanese and Hong Kong firms, to hold democratic trade
union elections, respectively in 2001, 200240 and 2003. This has put pressure on other
Western brand-name corporations41. For several years, the Chinese authorities and the
ACFTU chose to remain neutral not just regarding the monitoring initiatives, but also
with regard to enterprise-level elections. But in August 2003, a vice-president of the
ACFTU made references in a speech that was carried by the media to the effect that
foreigners  should  not  intervene  in  Chinese  trade  union  affairs42.  Nonetheless,  the
elected union committees at the three Reebok suppliers remain in place.
28 Elsewhere, “direct elections” of workplace trade union chairs have occurred at several
private enterprises in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces,  apparently as  a  result  of
regional  union initiatives43.  In  Hangzhou,  the  capital  city  of  Zhejiang,  310  factories
reportedly held direct elections five years ago, though this was kept out of the Chinese
news  media  until  200344.  In  September  2003  the  ACFTU  announced  that  it  would
promote such elections elsewhere in China within the next few years45.
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29 The timing of this announcement coincided with the ACFTU’s first public reaction to
the  corporate  social  responsibility  movement  and to  the  Reebok-inspired elections.
Some internal  ACFTU reports  noted  that  several  supplier  factories  had  held  direct
elections after being pressed to comply with Western corporation codes of conduct.
Thus,  popularising  “direct  elections”  could  be  the  ACFTU  strategy  to  forestall
foreigners coming in to set up workers’ committees. Whether such elections are truly
democratic  remains  a  question  to  be  studied,  as  “direct”  is  not  synonymous  with
“democratic”. As shown by a number of studies of village elections, the format, nature
and results of elections vary widely across China, yet, whatever the shortcomings, the
researchers’ overall consensus is that the elections have had a positive impact, often
giving  farmers  some  say  in  the  running  of  their  local  communities46.  Thus,  the
initiation of factory-level union elections in China, whether fully democratic or not,
may  gradually  have  the  effect  of  giving  workers  more  direct  representation  and a
means to check the power of management in protection of their own rights.
The ILO tripartite structure
30 Another avenue that may instigate change in China’s industrial relations involves the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). As a member state, China needs to establish a
tripartite peak body comprising representatives from a national labour union
federation, a peak employers’ association, and a government organ, in order to send
delegates from the three groups to the ILO’s annual meetings in Geneva. Whereas the
ACFTU  serves  as  China’s  peak  union  organisation,  there  was  no  peak  employers’
association, so in 1999 the China Enterprise Confederation (CEC) was set up to serve this
function. Its membership consists largely of state-enterprise management. In the ILO
tripartite model the three parties are supposed to be independent and strong enough
to carry out a meaningful “social  dialogue”. To the extent that such a peak system
evolves,  this  potentially  works  to  diffuse  the  statist  nature  of  China’s corporatist
arrangements.  Today,  the  system is  still  embryonic:  the  ACFTU remains  under  the
control of the Party-state,  and the CEC is still  under development47.  Nevertheless,  a
National Tripartite Consultative Committee was set up in 2001, with similar committees
at  all  administrative  levels  down  to  the  rural  townships.  An  ILO  fact-finding
commission found half a year after the tripartite committee’s establishment that: “The
tripartite system as presently constituted is unlikely to live up to the hopes placed in it
both now and in the future… However,  in  all  our  interviews with trade union and
employer  representatives  at  municipal  and  national  levels  we  found  a  clear
commitment  to  developing  the  capacity  of  their  respective  organisations  as
independent  representatives,  able  to  articulate  the  interests,  aspirations  and
grievances of their members within the system of social dialogue”48.
31 The fact-finding commission also  noted that  the  “ACFTU has  been the  most  active
proponent  of  tripartite  consultation  as  a  means  of  protecting  its  members  and
maintaining  social  peace”.  As  an  independent  observer  who  accompanied  the  two-
member  ILO  commission  in  its  investigations  across  China,  I  was  impressed  that
officials from China’s Ministry of Labour, which often sides with corporations in line
with the government’s pursuit of economic development, on two separate occasions
remarked that the ACFTU is “powerful”, as if the Ministry has difficulty cowing the
ACFTU into accepting its decisions. This characterisation is in line with the assertive
role the ACFTU has played in the national legislative process in helping to shape the
content  of  China’s  labour  laws.  Thus,  at  the  peak  level  the  ACFTU  appears  to  be
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successfully  manoeuvring to  make its  voice  heard and to  attain  greater  bargaining
power and at least a modicum of independence. 
Anticipating the future
32 At the very top, as illustrated by the above incident, the ACFTU has tried to stake out its
own position of labour representation as distinct from the state and employers. This is
made easier by the backing of an external supporter, in this case the ILO, of which the
Chinese government is a member state. The ACFTU has also continued to play an active
role on the legislative front. The revision of the Labour Law passed in 2001 was due in
part to its lobbying efforts. It is now participating in helping to draw up a revision of
the  Company  Law  to ensure  that  the  Staff  and  Workers  Representative  Congress
maintains its legal position in enterprises. The ACFTU’s survival instincts tell it that
unless it can represent the interests of the workers, it will become irrelevant.
33 The state enterprises traditionally all contain workplace unions and near-one hundred
percent unionisation rates, but the number of state enterprises continues to fall. The
ACFTU needs to maintain its membership and financial base by penetrating the non-
state enterprises that are increasing in numbers. But setting up workplace unions in
domestic private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises is not easy, given their
owners’ opposition, and very different from the traditional bureaucratic way of setting
up branches in state-owned enterprises. 
34 The aggressive stance taken by the ACFTU towards Wal-Mart is a new strategy that
seems to have worked with the quiet backing of the state. The demonstration effect of
this first-round victory may reverberate not only throughout China, but possibly have
repercussions around the world. The ACFTU has thus successfully taken on the world’s
largest  non-unionised  corporation.  The  largest  US  trade  union,  which  represents
America’s retail workers, the Service Employee International Union (SEIU), has been
making overtures to the ACFTU to join hands in unionising Wal-Mart retail outlets49.
35 At lower levels, particularly at the district and workplace levels, the union officialdom
has been overwhelmed by the power of local governments, capital and management.
But pressure has been building for lower-level union officers to be more responsive to
the needs of workers. The greatest pressure for the state-enterprise sector has come
from workers laid off due to bankruptcy and changes in ownership, while the open
exploitation  of  migrant  workers  confronts  the  unions  with  the  embarrassing
realisation that something needs to be done to remedy the abuses. As seen, the peak-
level  union  federation  has  been  able  to  get  clauses  inserted  into  labour  laws  that
provide workers with some legal leverage. Migrant workers have been able to use this
to secure unpaid wages. The labour laws have spawned an active, growing group of
lawyers and paralegals who specialise in representing aggrieved workers.  These are
embryonic,  hopeful  signs  that  enterprise-level  union  elections  may  become  more
frequent in future. In the state and collective sectors, the system of Staff and Workers
Representative  Congresses  can  sometimes  be  turned  to.  In  what  are  often  difficult
times for blue-collar workers in China, there exist these various rays of hope in the
labour relations arena.
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RÉSUMÉS
In  the  Western  press,  there  regularly  have  been reports  about  the  plight  of  Chinese  paid  a
pittance for working long hours making products for export1. The reports are accurate, and in
fact, in a great many factories labour standards have continued to decline. But there are new
developments in the labour arena that herald change. 
The formerly vast pool of impoverished workers from the countryside has begun drying up, as
increasing  numbers  consider  it  not  worthwhile  to  migrate  from  their  villages.  Western
multinationals have devised “corporate codes of conduct” setting a floor for labour standards
and, under pressure from the international anti-sweatshop movement, are seeking to enforce the
codes in the Chinese factories that produce goods bearing their brands. The Chinese Federation
of Trade Unions has mounted new efforts to establish union branches in foreign-run enterprises,
and has begun organising enterprise-level trade-union elections in state-owned enterprises. 
These and the several other important developments, which will be examined in this paper are
still  just emerging. Tracking them helps us see what may lie ahead in the coming decade in
Chinese labour relations.
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